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BANKING (ON) THE BRAIN: FROM CONSENT TO AUTHORISATION AND THE 
TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF SOLIDARITY 
 
Shawn H.E. Harmon* 
Aisling McMahon◊ 
 
Abstract: Modern technologies and biomedicine ambitions have given rise 
to new models of medical research, including population biobanking.  One 
example of biobanking is brain banking, which refers to the collection and 
storage of brain and spinal cord samples for research into neurological 
diseases.  Obviously, brain banking involves taking brains and tissue from 
deceased people, a fact which complicates the role of recruiters and makes 
consent a poor tool for stakeholders. After contextualising brain banking and 
considering the public health issues at stake, this paper explores the legal 
definitions and demands of, and actual processes around, consent in 
England/Wales/Northern Ireland and authorisation in Scotland, articulating 
and evaluating their conceptual and practical differences.  It then argues for 
an expanded but improved operation of ‘authorisation’ in the brain banking 
(and broader biobanking) setting, adopting ‘solidarity’ as our foundation and 
the improvement of the ‘public good’ our objective. 
 
Keywords: Authorisation – Consent – Brain Banking – Posthumous Donation 
– Autonomy – Solidarity – Human Tissue 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Modern technologies and ambitions for biomedicine have given rise to new models of 
medical research.  One such model is population biobanking, which is the practice of 
collecting tissue and data into a repository that can be used as a research tool by multiple 
researchers over a period of time.  However, despite widespread pursuit of, and support for, 
biobanking, considerable uncertainty persists around how to most optimally structure the 
governance of, and participation in, biobanks.  Significant debate has centred around how 
best to recruit participants, and whether consent could ever be ‘informed’.1  Some have 
argued for a more ‘open’ or ‘broad’ consent, and some for approaches that view consent as 
an ongoing process rather than a one-off event,2 and others have argued for a retreat from 
                                                          
*
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1
  See, e.g., V Árnason, ‘Coding and Consent: Moral Challenges of the Database Project in Iceland’ (2004) 
18 Bioethics 27- 29; B Knoppers, ‘Biobanking: International Norms’ (2005) 33 J Law, Med & Ethics 7-14; G 
Hengesson et al, ‘Ethical Framework for Previously Collected Bio Bank Samples’ (2007) 25 Nature 
Biotechnology 973-976; J Forsberg et al, ‘Changing Defaults in Biobank Research Could Save Lives Too’ (2010) 
25 Eur J Epidemol 65-68; J Allen & B McNamara, ‘Reconsidering the Value of Consent in Biobank Research’ 
(2011) 25 Bioethics 155-166. 
2
  See, e.g., T Caulfield et al, ‘Research Ethics Recommendations for Whole-Genome Research: 
Consensus Statement’ (2008) 6 PLoS Biology e73; A McGuire & L Beskow, ‘Informed Consent in Genomics and 
Genetics Research’ (2010) 11 Ann Rev Genomics & Human Genetics 361-381. 
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consent (and consent language) altogether,3 claiming that the more pertinent issues are 
those of ‘control’ and the advancement of the ‘public good’.  For a variety of reasons, it is 
argued, the consent paradigm’s focus on the position and wellbeing of the individual 
participant/donor and his or her autonomy sits uncomfortably in the biobanking model, 
which is prospective, purposively indeterminate, and aimed at furthering the interests of, 
and benefit to, the community as a whole.4 
This lack of congruity is heightened in brain banking because one is there dealing 
with ‘participants’ who are deceased at the time of their donation.5  The result is that third 
parties are more often and more directly drawn into the recruitment interaction. 
Participants are typically recruited in one of the following ways: 
 
• an individual decides to donate, and records their wishes in an Advance Directive or 
some other format, and their relatives are engaged and counselled after their death; 
 
• an individual is approached by a donor programme or their palliative care team, and 
agrees to donate, making their wishes known, and their relatives are engaged and 
counselled after their death;6 
 
• an individual makes no decision about donation or at least fails to inform anyone of 
his/her wishes surrounding donation, and an individual’s relatives may be approached 
about donation after their death, in which case the relatives become the primary 
decision-makers. 
 
This recruitment process raises some important practical questions which are (or can be) 
influenced by the recruitment model used: 
 
1. Who should consent in the absence of the expressed wishes of the deceased? 
 
2. If the known wishes of the deceased conflict with those of the family, who prevails? 
 
3. If re-consent is needed for new research, who should provide this, especially if the 
deceased gave the original consent? 
 
                                                          
3
  S Harmon, ‘Semantic, Pedantic or Paradigm Shift? Recruitment, Retention and Property in Modern 
Population Biobanking’ (2009) 16 Euro J Health Law 27-43.  See also G Hengesson et al, n 1 above, and T 
Caulfield et al, ‘Debate: DNA Databanks and Consent: A Suggested Policy Option Involving an Authorization 
Model’ (2003) 4 BMC Medical Ethics, doi:10.1186/1472-6939-4-1. 
4
 S Harmon, ibid.  Similar arguments have been made in the context of organ donation for 
transplantation purposes: see A Cronin & J Harris, ‘Authorisation, Altruism and Compulsion in the Organ 
Donation Debate’ (2010) 36 J Med Ethics 627-631. 
5
  Brain banking refers to the collection and storage of brain and spinal cord samples for research into 
neurological diseases: see J Bell et al, ‘Management of a Twenty-First Century Brain Bank: Experience in the 
BrainNet Europe Consortium’ (2008) 115 Acta Neuropathol 497-507. 
6
  For more on these, see A Schmitt et al, ‘How a neuropsychiatric brain bank should be run: A 
consensus paper of BrainNet Europe II’ (2007) 114 J Neural Transim 537-537.  For examples of disease-specific 
banks, see http://www.ukmstissuebank.imperial.ac.uk/ and http://www.parkinsonstissuebank.org.uk/. 
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This paper follows from the AHRC-funded ‘Banking (On) The Brain’ (BOTB) project.7  It 
examines the current framework for recruitment to brain banks in the UK.  At the outset, it 
must be acknowledged that post mortem examination (PME) rates are declining, which 
translates into an inability to secure brains and brain tissue for research (ie: hindered 
recruitment).8  Particular difficulties have been encountered in obtaining unaffected or 
‘normal’ brain tissue, which acts as a necessary control in the investigation of disease;9 
without sufficient quantities of both ‘diseased’ and ‘normal’ tissue, there is a real risk that 
research, which relies on numbers of statistical significance and control data, will be stifled 
or might lead to incorrect conclusions and improper solutions.10  There are, of course, a 
variety of reasons for this decline, including historical ambivalence toward autopsies,11 use 
of ownership models by families to claim possessory rights in bodies,12 and the organ 
retention scandals of the late 1990s.13  To these we would add the legislative frameworks 
under which recruitment now takes place. 
In the following pages, after contextualising brain banking and justifying its 
characterisation as supporting the public good, we consider ‘consent’ under the Human 
Tissue Act 2004 (HTA 2004),14 and ‘authorisation’ under the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 
                                                          
7
  Banking (On) The Brain, AHRC Exploratory Award No. AH/J011495/1, February-September 2012, 
funded under the AHRC’s Science and Culture Stream. 
8
  See, e.g., C Petri, ‘Decrease in the Frequency of Autopsies in Denmark After the Introduction of a New 
Autopsy Act’ (1993) 5 Qual Assur Health Care 315-8; L Erikkson & C Sunstrom, ‘Decreasing Autopsy Rate in 
Sweden Reflects Changing Attitudes Among Clinicians’ (1993) 5 Qual Assur Health Care 319-23; J Lund & G 
Tierney, ‘Hospital Autopsy: Standardised Questionnaire Survey to Determine Junior Doctors’ Perceptions 
(2001) 323 BMJ 21-22; C Hulette, ‘Brain Banking in the United States’ (2003) 62 J Neuropathol Exp Neurol 715-
722; G O’Grady, ‘Death of the Teaching Autopsy’ (2003) 327 BMJ 802-803, NHS Implementation Sub-Group, 
Can Cross-Sectional Imaging as an Adjunct and/or Alternative to the Invasive Autopsy be Implemented Within 
the NHS? (London: Crown, 2012). 
9
  T Millar et al, ‘Tissue and Organ Donation for Research in Forensic Pathology: The MRC Sudden Death 
Brain and Tissue Bank’ (2007) 213 J Pathology 369-375, at 374.  Families of deceased patients affected by a 
neurological disease are much more likely to authorise donation, or comply with the deceased’s desire to 
donate. 
10
  Ibid, at 369. 
11
  See R Richardson, Death, Dissection and the Destitute (London: Phoenix Press, 1988). 
12
  The unstable history of notions of property in relation to cadavers is exemplified by an evolution of 
cases: , e.g., R v Stewart (1840) 12 Ad. & El. 773; R v Fox (1841) 2 QB 246; R v Sharpe (1857) 169 ER 959; R v 
Feist (1858) Dears. & B. 590; Foster v Dodd (1867) 3 QB 67; Williams v Williams (1882) 20 Ch D 659; Dobson v 
North Tyneside HA (1996) 4 ALL ER 474, R v Kelly (1999) 2 WLR 384. 
13
  See, e.g., K Mason & G Laurie, Consent or Property? Dealing with the Body and its Parts in the Shadow 
of Bristol and Alder Hey’ (2001) 64 Mod Law Rev 710-729; S Dewar & P Boddington, ‘Returning to the Alder 
Hey Report and its Reporting: Addressing Confusions and Improving Inquiries’ (2004) 30 J Med Ethics 463-469.  
The Royal College of Pathologists Higher Specialist Training Committee, RCP Exam Guidelines - 2012, at 
<http://www.rcpath.org/Resources/RCPath/Migrated%20Resources/Documents/A/Exams_Autopsy_July_2012
.pdf> [17 September 2013], indicates that, in the wake of the organ retention scandal, physicians are hesitating 
to ask for autopsies, and, further, only 12% of junior doctors are informed when an autopsy is to take place, 
only 6% attend autopsies, and many are declining to take higher specialist training in autopsies, resulting in a 
general decline in skills. 
14
  This applies to England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, though note that on 2 July 2013, the Welsh 
government adopted the Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013, which implements a ‘soft opt-out’ system 
for organ donation, whereby individuals will be presumed to have consented for their organs to be donated 
unless they have opted out. Under this system, donation will not take place if a relative or longstanding friend 
of the deceased objects on the basis of the deceased’s views so long as a reasonable person would conclude 
that the relative or friend knows that the most recent prior-to-death view of the deceased on the matter of 
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2006 (HTSA 2006).  In doing so, we draw on secondary regulation from the Human Tissue 
Authority (HTA),15 and have reference to recruitment strategies deployed by brain bankers.  
After exploring the demands and consequences of consent in England/Wales/Northern 
Ireland and authorisation in Scotland, we argue for a more uniform shift from ‘consent’ to 
‘authorisation’, with the caveat that we must ground ‘authorisation’ on a wider value base 
than currently prevails. We close by making a case for improving the operation of 
authorisation in the biobanking and brain banking context by operationalising ‘solidarity’, 
which would facilitate a shift in thinking about donation. It would retreat from the 
contested concept of donation as an altruistic gift, advancing the view that donation is 
rather a contribution to the wider social fabric (ie: to individual health and the health of 
future generations) that is owed. 
 
II. PUBLIC GOODS AND PUBLIC HARMS 
 
In this section we argue that health is an important and valued ‘public good’ and we 
demonstrate that brain and neurological diseases are a serious and growing challenge to 
health.  We also point to the instrumental role that brain banks – by providing well-curated 
samples of human tissue to a community of researchers – play in advancing knowledge 
about brain development and conditions that affect the brain, and developing effective 
treatments for same.  These realities are important for justifying brain banking and the 
adoption of legal measures to support it. 
 
A. Health as a ‘Public Good’ 
 
A ‘public good’ is an end, outcome, or commodity which is ‘non-rivalrous’,16 or ‘non-
excludable’,17 or both (ie: one person’s use or enjoyment of such goods will neither negate 
nor diminish another person’s enjoyment).18  Applying these criteria in the health context, 
we can say that one person’s health does not necessarily diminish someone else’s health, 
and one’s achievement of health (or rather one’s possession of health and vitality) does not 
in the normal course limit others’ achievement of it; nobody in a population can be excluded 
from benefiting from a reduction in the risk of infectious disease, for example, and one 
person benefiting from this reduction in risk does not prevent anyone else from also 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
consent for donation was that of opposition: see s. 4(4)). This Act comes into effect in 2015, and it is only 
applicable in relation to the donation of organs for transplantation, not organs donated for research purposes. 
15
  As authorised by HTA 2004, s. 26(1), the HTA has produced nine Codes of Practice which articulate 
standards of conduct for persons carrying out activities within the remit of the HTA.  The existing codes pertain 
to consent, donation of solid organ for transplantation, post mortem examination, anatomical examination, 
disposal of human tissue, donation of allogeneic bone marrow and peripheral blood stem cells for 
transplantation, public display, import and export of human bodies, body parts and tissue and research, and 
can be found at http://www.hta.gov.uk/legislationpoliciesandcodesofpractice/codesofpractice.cfm [17 
September 2013]. 
16
  Something is ‘non-rivalrous’ if one’s use of it does not diminish another’s use. 
17
  Something is ‘non-excludable’ if its use cannot be or should not be limited to certain people. 
18
  For more on public goods, see B Prainsack & A Buyx, Emerging Biotechnologies: Technology, Choice 
and the Public Good (London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011) at 4.6.  For a critique on the report, see A 
Dawson & M Verweij, ‘Solidarity: A Moral Concept in Need of Clarification’ (2012) 5 Public Health Ethics 1-5. 
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benefiting.19  Of course, these claims might be complicated when there is a need to access 
limited healthcare resources to achieve that health, but, as will be argued below, this 
public/private divide is blurring and becoming irrelevant to the characterisation of health as 
a public good.20 
Some go so far as to argue that health is a global public good because enhanced 
mobility, international trade linkages, information flows, and cross-border environmental 
threats have accelerated the extra-national transmission of disease and of behavioural and 
environmental health risks/determinants.21 While we concur with this broader identification 
of public goods, it is not essential to our argument.  Further and relatedly, while we concede 
that the substance of what is meant by in the ‘public good’ may evolve over time,22 and that 
some manifestations of it might not easily co-exist,23 we take it as uncontroversial that 
health is also in the public good. In this sense, we take ‘in the public good’ to mean an 
activity which will bring about some real social welfare enhancing benefit to a community or 
society at large. 
 Individual and community health are the fount of all other social ambitions and 
achievements; without health and some level of vitality, very little can be accomplished (ie: 
no wealth-generation activities like labour, production or innovation, and no social activities 
such as democratic engagement or cultural generation).  Health is an important – and 
arguably the most important – constituent element of individual and community existence, 
and all societies must engage with and promote health or they risk failure.  The fundamental 
importance of individual and community health is reflected by the amount of critical 
thought, political attention, social and legal architecture, and public money directed at their 
realisation.  With respect to money note that the NHS typically represents one of the largest 
single national budget expenditures,24 and its 2011/12 budget was £106 billion 
(approximately 8.4% of GDP).25 
 Of course, while most will agree that health is ‘in the public good’, rational agents 
may well disagree about how to define health or health benefits.  This may give rise to 
                                                          
19
  Paraphrased from R Smith, ‘Global Public Goods and Health’ (2003) 81 WHO Bull 475. Arguments 
have also been made that surveillance of infectious diseases is a public good (W McNeill, Plagues and Peoples 
(NY: Anchor Books, 1976), and M Zacher, ‘Global Epidemiological Surveillance: International Cooperation to 
Monitor Infectious Diseases’ in I Kaul, I Grunberg & M Stern (eds.), Ibid, 266-283, and that actions aimed at 
controlling new environmental threats are public goods (A McMichael & A Haines, ‘Global Climate Change: The 
Potential Effects on Health’ (1997) 315 BMJ 805-809).   
20
  L Chen, T Evans & R Cash, ‘Health as a Global Public Good’ in I Kaul, I Grunberg & M Stern (eds) Global 
Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 284-304.  
21
  L Chen, T Evans & R Cash, Ibid, at 289. See also, R Smith, ‘Global Public Goods and Health’ (2003) 81(7) 
WHO Bulletin of the 475. For more on public goods in the global context, see, D Dalrymple, ‘Scientific 
Knowledge as a Global Public Good: Contributions to Innovation and the Economy’ in Steering Committee 
(eds.), The Role of Scientific and Technical Data and Information in the Public Domain (Washington DC: 
National Academies Press, 2003) 35-51. 
22
  For example, ‘public welfare’ was used as a justification to allow the compulsory sterilisation of the 
so-called ‘unfit’, which included those suffering from mental illness, in Buck v Bell (1927) 274 US 200. 
23
  G Laurie, P Mallia et al, ‘Managing Access to Biobanks: How Can We Reconcile Individual Privacy and 
Public Interests in Genetic Research?’ (2010) 10 Med Law Int 315-337. 
24
  Public health spending in England, for example, has increased to £4.7 billion (including 
pharmaceuticals but excluding secondary prevention): Department of Health, The NHS Belongs to the People: 
A Call to Action (London: NHS England, 2013), at 15. 
25
  Up from £437 million at its foundation in 1948: R Harker, NHS Funding and Expenditure (London: 
House of Commons Library, 2011). 
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difficulties in some contexts, but less so in the present one.  If we accept that brain disease, 
and particularly degenerative brain and neural conditions, are rising and are affecting 
significant levels of the population, then it becomes much less contestable to state that the 
pursuit of treatments for such conditions is in the public good.  How to decide on the type of 
research which should be pursued (ie: which conditions should be prioritised outside those 
which affect significant numbers) is a separate issue, but is nonetheless addressed briefly 
below. 
 
B. Brain Diseases as a Pressing Public Harm 
 
To state the obvious, health is diminished by injury and disease.  Thus, we require social 
systems (ie: policies, practices, institutions, instruments) for monitoring, maintaining, and 
restoring health.  In the UK, we have, inter alia, the NHS.  Like most free-at-point-of-service 
public health systems, the NHS began as an ambitious dream of universal care (and caring) 
which would serve to raise the relative welfare of society.26  While ambitions for and 
expectations placed on the NHS have perhaps declined from their lofty antecedents, it is still 
expected to deliver reasonable health to the public through effective interventions 
delivered fairly and efficiently by competent professionals. 
 Of course, questions persist as to what this might mean in practice, particularly in 
light of the following: 
 
• increasingly expensive technologies and treatments (from new, narrowly targeted and 
expensive drugs to IVF, etc.); 
• increasingly aged populations (imposing the treatment pressures of long-term and 
degenerative conditions); and 
• decreasing numbers of system contributors (in the form of taxable employed citizens). 
 
Questions also persist about the implications of privatisation of some services traditionally 
provided by the NHS, a main point of concern being the consequences of such on standards 
of care,27 and sharpening of health inequalities.28  Answers to these questions are not 
obvious, but also are not pertinent to the argument. 
 What is clear is that the NHS faces many difficult challenges as a result of changing 
demographics, demands, and disease patterns.  Neurodegenerative and other neurological 
diseases in particular are cited as pressing concerns.  In 2011, in the 27 EU countries plus 
Norway, Iceland and Switzerland (population: 514 million), disorders of the brain – defined 
as including mental and neurological illnesses – were estimated as costing €798 billion per 
                                                          
26
  See W Beveridge, ‘Social Insurance and Allied Services – 1942’ (2000) 78 WHO Bull 847-855. 
27
  See K Stacey, ‘NHS Privatisation with a Bill’, Financial Times, London, 17 April 2013,  at 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3bdd3b3e-a77d-11e2-9fbe-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2cLLIcmPs> [17 September 
2013], G Plummer, ‘’Arms’ race over £5bn in NHS work’, Financial Times, London, 29 July 2013) at 
<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6424b29e-f60a-11e2-a55d-00144feabdc0.html> [17 September 2013], D 
Campbell, ‘NHS privatisation fears deepen over £1bn deal’, Guardian, London 26 July 2013, at 
<http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/jul/26/nhs-privatisation-fears-deepen-deal> [17 September 
2013]. 
28
  See Secretary of State for Health, Government’s Response to the Health Committee Report on Health 
Inequalities (London: HMG, 2009). 
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year.29  This represents 25% of the direct healthcare costs in Europe, with indirect costs 
adding to this figure.30  A recent report estimated that the total cost of brain disorders in the 
UK in 2010 was €134 billion which included indirect costs, direct non-medical and direct 
healthcare costs.31  In fact, the NHS is said to be facing a ‘neurological time bomb’ due to 
expanding disease burdens and patient demand.32  The picture is similarly bleak at a global 
level, as it has been estimated that disorders of the brain account for 13% of the global 
disease prevalence, a level which surpasses both cardiovascular diseases and cancer.33  And 
quite aside from the resource implications of these disorders, the human impact is 
profound; they have life-altering health and functionality implications for the patients, and 
cause social and relational fallout for families. 
 Ultimately, individual and community health are seriously threatened by diseases of 
the brain, and will be increasingly threatened in the future, and this in turn will place more 
and more pressure on already straining healthcare systems around the world.34  As such, we 
can strongly claim that they are a pressing public harm which should be met by the pursuit 
of rationally connected public actions to bolster the public good that they diminish. 
 
III. BRAIN BANKING AND INTERESTS IN CADAVERS 
 
In this second section we argue that brain banking is such an action; it is in the public 
interest (ie: it supports in a very direct way the public good that is health), and any effort to 
regulate brain banking must be cognizant of the relative strengths of the interests at stake. 
 
A. Brain Banking in the ‘Public Interest’ 
 
The above harm snapshot justifies our claim that it is in the ‘public interest’ to actively 
facilitate health research, and, more specifically, research into the workings of, and 
disorders affecting, the brain.  We define ‘public interest’ as the aggregate interest of a 
populace and both the main objective and justification for democratically empowered 
political structures.35  So acts ‘in the public interest’ are acts which are ‘in the public good’ 
                                                          
29
  A Gustavsson, M Svensson, F Jacobi et al, ‘Cost of Disorders of the Brain in Europe 2010’ (2011) 21 Eur 
Neuropsychopharmacology 718-779. 
30
  Ibid, at 765. A study conducted in 2003 claimed that disorders of the brain accounted for nearly 35% 
of Europe’s entire disease burden: J Olsen & M Leonardi, ‘The Burden of Brain Disease in Europe’ (2003) 10 Eur 
J Neurol 471-477. 
31  N Fineberg, P Haddad et al, ‘The Size, Burden and Cost of Brain Disease in the UK’ (2013) 27 J 
Psychopharm 761-770.  The authors noted that this estimate of costs should be seen as conservative as some 
conditions such as body dysmorphic disorder could not be included in the analysis due to limitations of data. 
32
  N Triggle, ‘NHS facing neurology disease time-bomb’, BBC News, London, 17 January 2012, at 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-16581674> [17 September 2013]. 
33
  P Collins et al, ‘Grand Challenges in Global Mental Health’ (2011) 475 Nature 27-30.  Indeed, global 
burden of disease studies, which examine all disease groups, shows that higher proportions of global disease 
burdens will be attributed to brain disorders: C Murray & A Lopez (eds.), The Global Burden of Disease 
(Harvard: WHO, 1996). 
34
  See H Kretzschmar, ‘Brain Banking: Opportunities, Challenges and Meaning for the Future’ (2009) 10 
Nature Rev Neuroscience 70-78, at 71. 
35
  For more on public interest, see, e.g., P Napoli & N Creskill, Foundations of Communications Policy: 
Principles and Process in the Regulation of Electronic Media (NY: Hampton Press, 2001); L-S Ho, Public Policy 
and Public Interest (London: Routledge, 2011); A McHarg, ‘Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: 
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(ie: which have real welfare-enhancing potential for publics). 
 We recognise that defining ‘publics’ or ‘the public’ to which benefit should accrue in 
a given context, and how many  individuals an act needs to benefit for it to be deemed in 
‘the public interest’, may give rise to controversy; in fact the difficulty of drawing 
boundaries on the ‘public’ in other contexts has been noted in detail elsewhere.36  
Nonetheless, given that brain diseases are non-discriminatory of ‘publics’ in the sense that 
they may affect any individual regardless of ethnicity, socio-economic background, gender, 
age, etc., the ‘public’ which may be affected by illnesses of the brain will be significant and 
will encompass the vast majority of the population.  It follows that research on the brain is 
firmly within the public interest in the broadest sense. 
 Of course, with advances in genomics and the predictability of illnesses, including 
illnesses of the brain, the ‘public’ which may be affected by such diseases may be said to 
decrease.  Similarly, in the rare diseases context, one might argue that the public affected is 
much smaller, making it questionable whether pursing treatments on such diseases is in the 
broader public benefit.  However, both these claims can be countered.  First, predictability is 
often not nearly as objective or accurate as the term suggests.  Many factors can diminish or 
negate the predictability claimed in relation to genetic testing, including lifestyle and 
environmental factors, both of which might be imposed on the individual.  Second, from an 
impact perspective, rare diseases have consequences for people well beyond the number of 
those afflicted.  They place all manner of burdens and hardships on families and loved ones, 
sometimes both well before and well after onset of the disease in the patient.  Thus, 
research on the brain does not just benefit those who may suffer from illness, rather it has 
an important relational aspect.  All told, while the parameters of the ‘public’ can and have 
been contested elsewhere, it is reasonable to say that, given the prevalence, potential for 
harm and relational aspect of brain diseases, brain banking (and associated research) 
transcends the boundaries of the obviously concerned ‘publics’ and touches on a significant 
portion of the ‘public’. 
 Ultimately, while we recognise that it can be difficult (or rather a matter of 
contestation) to define what is truly in the ‘public interest’, or what it means to respect the 
‘public interest’,37 we take it as relatively uncontroversial that it is in the public interest to 
actively promote and support public goods, and, as we have shown, health is a public good.  
Further, brain banking is an integral part of (brain and neurological) health research and 
thus it is in the public interest to maintain and support the donation of tissue to such 
banks.38  Obviously, this argument is premised on the assumption that the banking 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(1999) 62(5) Modern Law Review 671-696. 
36  See; J Reardon, ‘The Human Genome Diversity Project: A Case Study in Coproduction’ (2001) 31 Soc 
Studies Science 357-388; J Reardon, ‘Race Without Salvation: Beyond the Science/Society Divide in Genomic 
Studies of Human Differences’ in B  Koenig et al (eds), Revisiting Race in a Genomic Age (NJ: Rutgers U Press: 
2008) 304-319; J Reardon, ‘Creating Participatory Subjects: Race, Science and Democracy in a Genomic Age’ in 
S. Frickel & K Moore (eds), The New Political Sociology of Science: Institutions, Networks, and Power (Madison: 
U Wisconsin Press: 2006) 351-377. 
37
  M Hӓyry & T Takala, ‘American Principles, European Values and the Mezzanine Rules of Ethical 
Genetic Databanking’ in M Hӓyry, R Chadwick, V Arnason & G Arnason (eds.), The Ethics and Governance of 
Human Genetic Databases (Cambridge: CUP, 2007) 14-36. 
38
  One might go further and argue that health research and the knowledge it generates is a public good 
in itself, but we need not go this far.  For a discussion of knowledge as a public good, see J Stiglitz, ‘Theory of 
Local Public Goods’ in M Feldstein & R Inman (eds.), The Economics of Public Services (NY: Halsted Press, 1997).  
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undertaking and the research it facilitates is both ethically robust and scientifically sound.  
On this point, it should be noted that the operation of all tissue banks in the UK, including 
brain banks, is dependent on having the appropriate ethics approval from a relevant 
Research Ethics Committee, as well as NHS Research & Development approval.39  A licensing 
scheme also applies under the Human Tissue Act 2004 to all tissue banks in England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland,40 ensuring that each bank meets appropriate ethical and safety 
standards.  Scotland has also recently adopted a non-statutory accreditation scheme for the 
collection and storage of human tissue in NHS Scotland.  Developed in consultation with 
NHS Scotland R&D Directors, NHS Scotland tissue bank managers, public partners, and 
Healthcare Improvement Scotland, the scheme seeks to ensure tissue banks adopt the 
highest possible professional standards.41  Additionally, all brain banks in the UK are part of 
the UK Brain Bank Network, which seeks inter alia to put in place common ‘gold’ standards 
for brain banking, including harmonised procedures for consent and stewardship across the 
UK.42  Finally, researchers seeking to obtain tissue from MRC-funded brain banks must also 
apply to the bank for permission.  This usually results in an assessment of the application 
based on its scientific merits, as well as the likelihood of it giving rise to ethical issues.43  
Ethically approved research using samples obtained from ethically robust brain banks will 
generate knowledge that will: 
 
• contribute to deeper understandings of the brain and human body; 
• illuminate the causes and progression of diseases; 
• contribute to more effective and less invasive cures, treatments, and/or management 
strategies for the afflicted; and 
• inform more cost-efficient and effective ways of structuring and delivering healthcare 
system responses. 
 
Further, the knowledge created will be probed and built-upon thereby expanding human 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
For arguments against scientific knowledge being a public good, see M Callon & G Bowker, ‘Is Science a Public 
Good?’ (1994) 19 Sci Tech & Human Values 365-424, and T Kealey, ‘The Myth of Science as a Public Good’, 
Lecture to the Oxford Libertarian Society, Christ Church College, University of Oxford, 22 May 2009.  For a 
discussion of the public interest in the context of organ transplantation, see J Harris, ‘Organ Procurement: 
Dead Interests, Living Needs, Cadaver Organs Should be Automatically Available’ (2003) 29 J Med Ethics 130-
134. 
39  Such approval can be applied for online through the Integrated Research Application System, 
available at https://www.myresearchproject.org.uk/SignIn.aspx. 
40
  See HTA 2004 ss16-25. 
41
  Chief Medical Officer, ‘Letter on the Accreditation Scheme for the Collection and Storage of NHS 
Tissue in Scotland’ (2011), available at http://www.sehd.scot.nhs.uk/cmo/CMO(2011)07.pdf, at para. 1 
42
  For more see 
http://www.mrc.ac.uk/Ourresearch/Resourceservices/UKBrainBanksnetwork/index.htm.  
43
  Ibid.  Should the solidarity model proposed infra be adopted, further methods of ethical approval may 
be considered in order to ensure research conducted from such samples is in pursuit of knowledge and/or 
conditions of a pressing social/medical nature.  Should there be financial or tissue shortages, mechanisms 
prioritising certain pursuits/interventions may also need to be pursued.  Methods of public engagement might 
be investigated to extend to publics a more active role in such decisions.  In any event, the precise contours of 
such a framework requires further investigation and is beyond the scope of this paper.  It is enough for our 
argument to highlight the already stringent mechanisms of ethical approval that are required, and to note that 
these may and could be strengthened to align more closely with public objectives, thereby giving the ‘public’ a 
more active role in the process as befits the solidarity model. 
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knowledge beyond that envisioned by the initial cost and contribution.44  The long-term 
aggregate impact of brain banks will be to reduce human suffering and to promote (and 
realise) better health and human functionality.45  In fact, biobanks (of which brain banks are 
just one genre) have already been defended as valuable resources for the public interest: 
 
[W]e offer the following proposition: scientifically sound, ethically robust 
research using biobanks is manifestly in the public interest. We would, in 
fact, go further and suggest that there is a positive moral obligation to 
promote the use of these research resources in ways that, in turn promote 
the public interest. This can only happen through access. The imperative, 
then, is to promote access on sound scientific, ethical, and legal principles.46 
 
While brain banks have already been instrumental in furthering our understanding of 
central nervous system function and neurological diseases like Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, and 
Multiple Sclerosis,47 and in recognising new types of diseases,48 their benefits are not 
necessarily expected to be enjoyed by the individuals who participate/donate.  A long view 
of the research investment is evident, wherein the collective is prioritised over the 
individual.  In this way, brain banks serve as mechanisms of intergenerational justice (ie: the 
present generation contributes positively to the utility and better health of future 
generations).  In our view, this enhances the status of brain banks as being in the public 
interest for it permits greater benefits to emerge for a wider community over time. 
We concede that the state’s obligation to foster brain banking depends on its 
rational connection (or necessity) to the public good sought to be advanced (eg: health for 
individuals and publics).  In this respect, it is notable that while technological advances allow 
improved disease progress monitoring in living brains, cell cultures, and animal models,49 
developments have not rendered the need for examination of cadaveric brains obsolete.50  
                                                          
44
  It is re-used and reconsidered, a process which further verifies knowledge and adds value to it: M 
Callon & G Bowker, n 38 above, who, at 401, argue that scientific knowledge ‘… is a durable good, not 
destroyed or altered by its use.  Even better, the more it is used the more its value increases because it proves 
its fecundity, widens the scope of its applications, and becomes richer’. 
45
  For a discussion of the scientific knowledge being generated by such networks, see M Callon & G 
Bowker, in 38 above, and M Callon, ‘Four Models for the Dynamics of Science’ in S Jasanoff et al (eds.), 
Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Newbury Park: SAGE, 1994) 29-63. 
46
  See G Laurie & P Mallia, n 23 above, at 322. 
47
  See, e.g., H Kretzschmar, n 34 above; A Kutzelnigg et al, ‘Cortical Demyelination and Diffuse White 
Matter Injury in Multiple Sclerosis’ (2005) 128 Brain 2705-2712; S Roemer et al, ‘Pattern specific loss of 
aquapoporin-4 immunoreactivity distinguishes neuromyelitis optica from multiple sclerosis’ (2007) 130 Brain 
1194-1205; B Trapp et al, ‘Axonal transection in the lesions of multiple sclerosis’ (1998) 338 New Eng J Med 
278-285; B Serami et al, ‘Dysregulated Epstein-Barr virus infection in the multiple sclerosis brain’ (2007) 204 J 
Experimental Med 2899-2912. 
48
  D Murphy & B Ravina, ‘Brain Banking for Neurodegenerative Diseases’ (2003) 9 Current Opin Neurol 
459-463. 
49
  See J Bell et al, n 5 above, at 498, and H Kretzschmar, n 34 above, at 71. 
50
  J Bell et al, ibid, at 498, and J Burton, ‘Clinical, Educational and Epidemiological Value of Autopsy’ 
(2007) 369 Lancet 1471-1480.  Cadaveric brains are obtained at post mortem examinations, at which the brain 
is divided in two; one section is stored in formalin for neuropathologic diagnosis, whilst the other is frozen and 
stored at -80°C in the brain bank to be distributed to requesting members of the scientific community who 
have fulfilled relevant ethical and legal criteria: H Kretzschmar, n 34 above, at 71 and 75, and S Harmon & G 
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If anything, given its support of genetics and functional genomics – which themselves have 
given rise to techniques which facilitate better understandings of disease pathogenesis and 
potential therapeutic targets – PME and removal of tissue for brain banks is more crucial 
than ever for investigating neurological diseases and providing evidence of the efficacy of 
therapies.51  Thus, it is vital that we have sufficient samples available in order to advance 
neurological understandings.  In summary, the public’s interest in brains is strong and the 
connection between procuring them, generating relevant scientific and health knowledge, 
and improving health is all rationally (indeed closely) connected. 
The presence of commercialisation might be used to undermine the characterisation 
of brain banking as in the public interest.  Private (commercial) entities do and will continue 
to play an integral role in the realisation of improved health.  The realities of drug 
innovation are that it is time and cost-intensive beyond the capacity of purely public 
support.  This, combined with the large and potentially lucrative market for neurological 
treatments means that commercial entities will be interested and involved in brain and 
neurological research, and, to a lesser extent, in the formation and maintenance of brain 
banks to support that research. However, commercial involvement does not negate the 
public nature of the problem, the public interest in brain banking (and research), nor the 
public good character of health.52 
The primary consequence of commercial involvement is that some (or all) of the 
eventual treatments may be subject to patent protection (or intellectual property 
enclosure), thereby rendering them temporarily excludable, or selectively available through 
licensing strategies or pricing regimes. This is, of course, not ideal; it means that individuals 
will be asked/encouraged/required to donate for the public good in the absence of an 
assurance that their donation will result in something instrumental that will be immediately 
available to everyone equally. However, two matters serve to undermine this challenge. 
First, although the interplay of regimes is such that intellectual property diminishes access, 
this diminishment must be viewed as temporary. The fact is that the knowledge will 
eventually fall completely into the public domain, and in the preceding period treatments 
will be available to patients, though their availability might be narrowed by costs to the 
bearers of healthcare funding (eg: taxpayers and/or individuals). Second, given the gravity of 
the health problem society faces, it behoves us to work within the confines of the legal 
order that has evolved in this context, even if this means that sub-optimal availability of 
treatments (which we readily admit, but which is not at all remedied by using the contested 
involvement of the intellectual property regime to deny the existence of brain banking as 
being in the public interest). 
Given the ambiguous role of commercialisation, scientific knowledge is sometimes 
described as an ‘impure’ public good, in the sense that if there is patent or other IP 
protection the knowledge becomes temporarily excludable (and therefore fails the non-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Haddow, ‘Banking (On) the Brain: The Neurological in Culture, Law and Science’ (2012) 12 Med Law 
International 79-91, at 83. 
51
  J Bell et al, ibid; H Kretzschmar, ibid; T Miller et al, n 9 above; J Bell, J Nicoll et al, ‘Neuropathology of 
Human Alzheimer Disease after Immunization with Amyloid-beta Peptide: A Case Report’ (2003) 9 Nat Med 
448-452.  See also, e.g., N Cairns & P Lantos, ‘Brain Tissue Banks in Psychiatric and Neurological Research’ 
(1996) 49 J Clinical Path 870-873; C Hulette, ‘Brain Banking in the United States’ (2003) 63 J Neuropathol Exp 
Neurol 715-722. 
52
  A point already made by L Chen, T Evans & R Cash, n 20 above. 
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excludability criteria).53  Some have pointed to general public misgivings around commercial 
involvement in and profit arising from such research, noting the common perception of 
donation as a ‘gift’ and the concomitant assumption that it will not be associated a financial 
return to another.54  To alleviate these misgivings, they have advanced benefit-sharing 
models based on the Newfoundland and Labrador Model.55  This model requires a proposal 
for benefit sharing to be provided along with the application for ethical approval.  
Obviously, a similar framework could inform brain bank resource access, thereby ensuring 
not only that only approved research which was deemed to be in the public interest is 
carried out, but also that measurable benefits are returned to the community, even when 
private enterprises are accessing the resource. 
In any event, our claim is simply that health research conducted using samples 
provided by brain banks has the potential to generate knowledge which will facilitate the 
understanding of diseases and the development of treatments.  This is undoubtedly of 
benefit to individuals and to levels of community health and functionality.56  Hence, it is in 
the public interest to promote the generation of such knowledge and brain banks and 
associated research should therefore be actively encouraged, or at the very least not 
unnecessarily impeded. 
 
B. Ranking the Stakeholders’ Interests 
 
Before proceeding to a critique of how the law supports brain banking, it is important to 
consider who has or may assert an interest in the material that is the ‘life-blood’ of brain 
banks (ie: cadavers and their brains).  We suggest that the (formerly) living individual, the 
surviving family, and the public may all assert some interest, and the relative strength and 
foundation of that interest is considered below. 
The first interest-holder is the deceased individual.  While alive, that individual had 
interests and rights enforceable against others, including the state and family members, 
though none of these rights would have been absolute.  Additionally, the deceased can, 
while alive, express testamentary wishes in relation to a variety of matters which will be 
enforceable after death through the estate using legal/state mechanisms (eg: disposition of 
property, use of personal likeness, disposition of body, etc.), although again there are limits 
                                                          
53
  See J Stiglitz, ‘Knowledge as Global Public Good’ in I Kaul, I Grunberg & M Stern (eds.), Global Public 
Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (Oxford: OUP, 1999, 308-325, at 310.  Reforms aimed at 
more open access to scientific knowledge arguably contribute to the ‘purity’ of scientific knowledge (from a 
public interest perspective).  For a discussion of the importance of open access models in the biobank context, 
see A Marks & K Steinberg, ‘The Ethics of Access to Online Genetic Databases: Private or Public’ (2002) 2 Am J 
Pharmacogenomics 207-212. 
54
  Haddow et al, ‘Tackling Community Concerns about Commercialisation and Genetic Research: A 
Modest Interdisciplinary Proposal’ (2007) 64 Soc Sci Med 272-282. 
55
  As proposed in D Pullman & A Latus, ‘Policy Implications of Commercial Human Genetic Research in 
Newfoundland and Labrador: A Report for the Newfoundland and Labrador Department of Health and 
Community Services (St John’s: DOHCS, 2003).  
56
  Of course, one might question whether any public good is realised without some private and/or 
commercial contribution and therefore interference.  As such, the interplay of commercial interests here 
makes no difference to the characterisation of health as a ‘public good’, or to brain banks as being in the 
‘public interest’. 
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as to what can be expected/demanded.57  In complying with these wishes/instructions, we 
might claim that we are vindicating the individual’s autonomy, but this is not entirely 
accurate.  Presumably, an autonomous decision was made while alive, but at the time of 
(posthumous) enforcement, it is not autonomy that we are vindicating for the deceased 
ceases to ‘be’ and nothing can physically or emotionally harm or improve his or her position.  
This has led to compelling arguments that all of the deceased’s autonomy and interests 
(together with the ability to personally enforce them) evaporate at death, and there are no 
obvious residual interests to defend.58  Bolstering this position is jurisprudence to the effect 
that human rights cannot be claimed or enforced by or on behalf of someone who is not 
living.59 
One might argue that it is a dignity-based respect for the deceased that compels us 
to comply with the deceased’s wishes (and to legislate compliance through instruments like 
the HTA 2004 and HTSA 2006), but again the deceased remains indifferent to that dignity.  
He or she has none to claim or display. Ultimately, it might be more the survivors’ 
remembrance of that (former) autonomy and dignity that is being respected.  It is a claim by 
the survivors to that intangible that connects the past to the present and the future (the 
deceased to the living and the as-yet unrealised descendants).  While the maintenance of 
such connections has value, one might question whether they seriously serve to strengthen 
a deceased’s interest in his or her cadaver, which must be viewed as weak.  It might serve to 
favourably place the survivors’ interests in the cadaver, but more tangible and legally 
recognisable interests might be desired for purposes of ranking claims. 
With respect to survivors, it is the deceased’s family who will, in the normal course, 
have the best interest in the cadaver.  Grieving relatives and loved ones will have a strong 
emotional connection to the deceased, and thus, the current practice understandably seeks 
to put their interests centre-stage; this is a noble and compassionate response.   However, 
while we acknowledge that family members can have enforceable (legal) interests in 
relation to the living individual (interests that are enforceable against the state, against 
others, and against the individual him or herself), those interests diminish upon the 
individual’s death, or rather the right to enforce those interests diminish, often to the point 
of nullity (although we acknowledge that claims against an estate can persist).  With respect 
to the actual corpse, family members might invoke ECHR Article 8 (right to private and 
family life) and/or Article 9 (right to freedom of thought, consciences or religion) to ensure 
its disposal in a certain way,60 but the key point is that their legally recognised interest in the 
                                                          
57
  In this regard, there is significant scholarship on the limits of the dead-hand: see, e.g., T Kester, ‘Can 
the Dead Hand Control the Dead Body? The Case for a Uniform Bodily Remains Law’ (2007) 29 W New Eng Law 
Rev 571, L Friedman, Dead Hands: A Social History of Wills, Trusts and Inheritance Law (Stanford: Stanford U 
Press, 2009). 
58
 J Harris, ‘Law and the Regulation of Retained Organs: The Ethical Issues’ (2006) 22 Legal Studies 527-
549, at 539. For more on posthumous interests, see, e.g., A Baier, ‘The Rights of Past and Future Persons’ in E 
Partridge (ed), Responsibilities to Future Generations (NY: Prometheus Books, 1980) 171-183; T Wilkinson, 
‘Individual and Family Consent to Organ and Tissue Donation: Is the Current Position Coherent?’ (2005) 31 J 
Med Ethics 587-590; D Sperling, Posthumous Interests: Legal and Ethical Perspectives (Cambridge: CUP, 2008). 
59
  See Vo v France, Case No. 53924/00, 08/07/2004 (ECtHR), wherein the court refused standing for an 
unborn foetus, stating that rights could only be held once the foetus was born alive. 
60
  For example, see Pannullo & Forte v France, Case No. 37794/97, 30/01/2002 (ECtHR), and Girard v 
France, Case No. 22590/04, 30/09/2011 (ECtHR), wherein Article 8 was used by survivors of the deceased to 
have a body returned for burial. 
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cadaver is restricted to possession for disposal (eg: burial or cremation).61  The operation of 
these provisions is aimed at vindicating the deceased’s (and more often the survivors’) 
rights to have spiritual/religious and ceremonial expectations/conditions met (and so ties 
into the dignity and memorial interests articulated above).  However, even then it has been 
held that the public interest might override their interests and/or stated position.62 
Finally, there is the public’s interest in cadavers, which are grounded in state 
obligations to advance individual and public health, which, in turn, strengthen the social 
fabric and viability of communities. The state’s interest in public health has long been 
considered an important public interest, and a legitimate target for state action.63  The 
disposition of cadavers as part of that action ensures that cadavers are properly/safely 
disposed of so as not to pollute public spaces and essential utilities, and the state’s 
allocation of cadavers for use serves to: 
 
• contribute to medical training so our incoming physicians understand anatomy and how 
to handle the body;64 
 
• improve the evidence-base around cause of death and the efficacy of treatments, 
thereby improving healthcare decision-making;65 
 
• improve the evidence-base around clinical counselling and healthcare decisions, 
thereby reducing the chance of clinical misunderstandings and/or errors;66 and 
 
• advance human knowledge, particularly life science knowledge and understandings of 
drug pathways and mechanisms, thereby facilitating new cures and treatments.67 
                                                          
61
  See J Harris, n 58 above, at 533. 
62
  In Regina v Greater Manchester North District Coroner, Ex parte Worch [1987] QB 627, wherein a 
practising Jew was found dead after a car crash, the Coroner was held to be justified in conducting a PME 
despite this being contrary to Jewish law because it was necessary to determine whether the deceased had 
died of natural causes prior to the crash or had been killed in the crash. 
63  Its interest in maintaining public health has long supported public authorities’ overriding power in 
relation to the burial of human bodies: see s. 46, Public Health (Control of Diseases) Act 1984, as amended. 
64
  See, e.g., R Charlton, ‘Autopsy and Medical Education: A Review’ (1994) 87 H R Soc Med 232-236; J 
Hooper & S Geller, ‘Relevance of the Autopsy as a Medical Tool: A Large Database of Physician Attitudes’ 
(2007) 131 Arch Pathol & Lab Med 268-274. 
65
  See the remit and ambitions for the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), at 
<http://www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/whatwedo/what_we_do.jsp> [17 September 2013].  Studies show that, in 
cases of multiple causes of death, a majority of death certificates are inaccurate in the absence of PME, with 
many of the undiagnosed causes of death considered treatable: see M D’Amico et al, ‘Ill-defined and Multiple 
Causes on Death Certificates: A Study of Misclassification in Mortality Statistics’ (1999) 15 Eur J Epidemiol 141-
148, and M Nashelsky & C Lawrence, ‘Accuracy of Cause of Death Determination Without Forensic Autopsy 
Examination’ (2003) 24 Am J Forensic Med Pathol 313-319. 
66
  Studies show that adequate PMEs combined with case discussion at hospital level can improve safety 
and better inform practice choices: D Hoyert, Vital an Health Statistics: The Autopsy, Medicine, and Mortality 
Statistics, Series 3 (Maryland: DOH, 2001).  A study of neonatal autopsies in south-east Scotland showed that 
PMEs generated new information in 26% of cases, and in 3% of cases that new information proved crucial for 
counselling: M Brodie et al, ‘Ten Years of Neonatal Autopsies in a Tertiary Referral Centre: Retrospective Study’ 
(2002) 324 BMJ 761-763.  
67
  See, e.g., L Calabrese & A Fleischer, ‘Thalidomide: Current and Potential Clinical Applications’ (2000) 
108 Am J Med 487-95; M McDermott, ‘The Continuing Decline of Autopsies in Clinical Trials: Is there a way 
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Indeed, the value of PMEs has led some to argue that medical authorities should reject the 
classification of PMEs as elective and adopt them as a professional obligation,68 although 
this might have unsustainable resource allocation consequences. 
The state’s interest in health also engages some of its responsibilities under human 
rights law, most particularly those implicated by the so-called ‘right to health’; the right to 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, and to a standard of living 
adequate for health and basic needs is contained in numerous international instruments.69  
This right may be inferred from Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(1950), which states: 
 
Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of 
his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following 
his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 
 
Importantly, the ‘right to health’ is increasingly seen as essential to achieving equitable 
societies.  It has informed health policy reforms,70 and constitutional provisions linked to the 
right to life, to dignity, and to physical integrity.71  In combination with the legal and social 
entitlements that Europeans generally enjoy (and expect),72 the effect of this right is that 
individuals have higher aspirations than ever before for achieving and sustaining good 
health, including health in old age,73 and this will surely continue in future generations. 
To make this right effective, the state, through health authorities, must make 
suitable and timely treatment options available.  To date, jurisprudence drawing on the right 
to health has imposed on states and health authorities the obligation to: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Back?’ (2004) 89 Arch Dis Child Fetal Neonatal Ed F198-F199; B Cunha et al, ‘Renal Transplant with 
Bronchiolitis Obliterans Organizing Pneumonia (BOOP) Attributable to Ttacrolimus and Herpes Simplex Virus 
(HSV) Pneumonia’ (2012) 41 Heart Lung 310-315. 
68
  R Hill, R Anderson & R Vance, ‘The Autopsy: A Professional Obligation Dissected’ (1990) 21 Hum 
Pathol 127. 
69
  Instruments include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), UN General Assembly Res. 
217A (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., UN Doc. A/810, 1948, Article 25; the WHO Constitution (1948), adopted at the 
International Health Conference, New York, June-July 1946, Preamble; the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), 993 UNTS 3, Articles 9 and 12 and General Comment 3; the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966), 660 UNTS 195; the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990), 1577 UNTS 44; the Declaration of Alma-Ata (1978), at 
<http://www.who.int/publications/almaata_declaration_en.pdf> [17 September 2013]; the Ottawa Charter for 
Health Promotion (1986), at <http://www.who.int/healthpromotion/conferences/previous/ottawa/en/> [17 
September 2013]; the Bangkok Charter for Health Promotion in a Globalised World (2005), at 
<http://www.who.int/healthpromotion/conferences/6gchp/hpr_050829_%20BCHP.pdf> [17 September 
2013]. 
70
  Uganda Ministry of Health, Review of the HSSPII in Relation to Human Rights and Gender as Part of 
the Third-Term Review for the Health Sector, Second Draft (Kampala: Ministry of Health, 2008). 
71
  H Hogerzeil et al, ‘Is Access to Essential Medicines as Part of the Fulfilment of the Right to Health 
Enforceable Through the Courts?’ (2006) 368 Lancet 305-311. 
72
  Including strong mobility rights, increasing levels of education, widely available information about 
technological capabilities and geographic inequalities, and rising desires for varied, self-actualising leisure 
opportunities. 
73
  E Rynning, ‘The Ageing Populations of Europe: Implications for Health Systems and Patients’ Rights’ 
(2008) 15 Euro J Health Law 297-306. 
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• ensure that hospitals employ competent staff who are trained and work to a 
professional level within systems that protect patients;74 
• avoid putting an individual’s life at risk through the denial of care that they would have 
made available to the larger population.75 
• restructure national healthcare systems to improve care.76 
 
Essentially, states and health authorities are expected to achieve more and to deliver better 
health outcomes (usually with fewer resources), and this will be true with respect to 
burdensome and widely experienced neurological diseases.  The use of cadavers is a vital 
component of fulfilling that expectation.  Indeed, the importance of deceased donation was 
recently emphasised in the Human Transplantation of Organs (Wales) Act 2013, which 
introduces a soft opt-out system for organ donation for transplantation in Wales.  
Interestingly, s. 2 of the Act imposes a duty on Welsh Ministers to ‘promote transplantation 
as a means of improving the health of the people of Wales’.  This marks a firm commitment 
to improving the health of people through cadaveric donation.  Similar arguments could be 
made to justify promotion of donation for research; while such donation does not have the 
immediate and personal effect as in transplantation, it has the potential to generate 
knowledge which could improve the condition of generations (and may reduce the demand 
for transplantation which now wildly exceeds supply). 
Given the above, we argue that the public (ie: the collective as represented by the 
state) has the greatest/strongest interest in cadavers and their disposition.  The deceased’s 
interests and those of the surviving family might be personal, sentimental, or community-
bonding, and they are largely dignity-based.  By contrast, the public’s interests are 
utilitarian, instrumental, and pressing.  They are solidly grounded in human rights 
responsibilities and expectations, but they are also community-bonding.  Realisation of 
those public interests will generate great advantage for a great number of people, and will 
also enhance the dignity of those people (by giving them better health, better lives, and 
better deaths). 
 
IV. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR BRAIN BANK RECRUITMENT 
 
The above demonstrates that, when crafting regulation governing the life sciences – which 
are strongly linked to advances in healthcare and health – it is vital that we think about: 
 
1. the ‘public good’ and how we can better advance it; 
 
2. what we expect of medical research and the scientific knowledge generated therefrom; 
 
3. whether we are willing to contribute sufficiently to the enterprise to fulfil the great 
expectations we have placed in it. 
 
As part of that exercise, it is axiomatic that the applicable legal framework be designed to 
                                                          
74
  Savage v South Essex Partnership NHS Foundation [2008] UKHL 74 (HL). 
75
  Cyprus v Turkey (2002) 35 EHRR 30 (ECtHR). 
76
  Tutela Decision, T-760/2008, 31 July 2008, Colombian Constitutional Court. 
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shape behaviour to facilitate the public good, not frustrate it, and to recognise and 
accurately reflect the interests at stake.  In terms of shaping behaviour, the legal framework 
should facilitate donation by ensuring that an individual’s express wish to donate is carried 
out and not overridden by third party interests.  Individuals should be made aware that in 
the event of uncertainty there would be a presumption in favour of donation.  This would 
encourage individuals to think seriously about donation and facilitate wider (and maybe 
deeper) public thinking around medical research. 
 In other contexts, rewards are provided in order to encourage donation such as 
providing cheaper healthcare for those who donate samples for research purposes.77  
However, such schemes have been challenged on grounds that they may be exploitative or 
derogatory of ‘true’ consent.78  While we do not necessarily agree with this challenge, we do 
not recommend a rewards system for brain donation in part because of the difficulties 
arising from the fact that the donor would be deceased at the time of donation.  An 
important aspect of our approach is the attitudinal shift that solidarity could bring: 
individuals would come to better appreciate the individual obligations that they bear and to 
recognise donation as a contribution to health, including their own, all of which might result 
in stronger community sentiment toward donation.  In short, for the public good to be truly 
acknowledged in biolaw, the legal framework must be designed to (strongly) encourage 
individual contribution.79 
 Given all of the above, two questions are implicated: (1) How has the law been 
fashioned? (2) How is it working to support brain banking?  In this section, we explore those 
questions, focusing on the regulatory frameworks in England/Wales/Northern Ireland and 
Scotland respectively.  After articulating the conceptual foundation of the legal regimes, we 
examine the consent and authorisation models more closely, highlighting intended 
differences, and then the problematic role of families in brain bank recruitment, which 
tends to negate those differences. 
 
A. Conceptual Foundations of the Legislative Frameworks 
 
The existing framework for the donation of human tissue, including brain tissue, emerged as 
a result of public concern (and outrage) over non-consensual post mortem removal and 
retention of organs in both England and Scotland.80  Investigations undertaken at the time 
                                                          
77
  An example of this is the HFEA-accepted practice of ‘egg-sharing’ where a range of benefits may be 
offered by fertility clinics to women undergoing infertility treatment if they donate ova to other couples or for 
research purposes.  This generally involves a reduced fee for fertility treatment.  For more see 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/1411.html.  See also, A McNab, ‘HFEA Statement on Donating Eggs for Research’ 
(2007), available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/471.html.  Though payment for donation is prohibited, donors 
can receive £750 per cycle of donation to cover expenses and loss of earnings, see 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/donating-for-research.html. 
78  For a discussion of these arguments and the experiences of donors in the context of egg-sharing, see 
E Haimes, K Taylor  I Turkmendag, ‘Eggs ethics and Exploitation? Investigating Women’s Experiences of an Egg 
Sharing Scheme’ (2012) 34 Sociology of Health & Illness 1199–1214. 
79
  Recall that the public’s compelling interests in cadavers are currently being met with declining PME 
rates with the result that brain banks struggle with recruitment. 
80
 For the Scottish investigations, see Audit Scotland, Organ Retention Validation Review: Performance 
Audit (Edinburgh: Audit Scotland, 2002).  For the English investigations, see Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry, 
Interim Report: Removal and Retention of Human Material. (London: Crown, 2000); Royal Liverpool Children’s 
Inquiry, The Royal Liverpool Children’s Inquiry: Summary and Recommendations (London: Crown, 2001);  Chief 
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found that the brain was the organ most often retained, although most brains were retained 
for diagnostic rather than research purposes.81  They were retained as a result of genuine 
beliefs that retention was in the ‘public interest’, and erroneous beliefs that the Coroner or 
Procurator Fiscal could authorise retention of organs which had no bearing on the cause of 
death.82  Interestingly, the primary cause of distress was the lack of information and 
consultation rather than the retention itself.83  In any event, the public outcry resulted in a 
heavy emphasis by policymakers and legislative reformers on ensuring disclosure and 
clearer decisional frameworks for post mortem retention of tissue.  The resultant legislative 
frameworks were heavily shaped by ‘autonomy’ and ‘risk’, concepts that place the individual 
at the centre of all things and emphasise the need to ‘protect’ people ‘from’ the medical 
establishment and the harms that might follow from research participation. 
Autonomy acknowledges the human capacity (and desire) for self-determination and 
self-rule.  It values people as physical, psychological, economical and legal entities 
individuated from others, and respect for autonomy involves creating spaces for individuals 
to make decisions relating to themselves with as little interference (or coercion or duress) as 
possible.84  It therefore serves as a foundation for rights relating to physical integrity, 
freedom from coercion, and privacy.85  Risk is the potential or probability of some event or 
occurrence happening that is negative or harmful to individuals and communities (eg: 
something that destroys, damages, injures, unbalances, challenges, questions, or affronts).86  
Risk discourses have increased in society as people, driven by autonomy, wish to control 
more and more of the lived environment and their destinies within it.  As this has happened, 
the regulatory concern with risk has also climbed, with much regulation aimed at minimising 
deviations from the (agreed) norm.87 
Given the above, the doctrines of consent and, latterly, authorisation have emerged.  
In the medical context, consent grew from a desire to protect individuals against harm or 
unwanted invasions of bodily integrity.88  In the research context, it developed with the goal 
of ensuring respect for individuals and avoiding a repetition of the medico-scientific 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Medical Officer, The Removal, Retention and Use of Human Organs and Tissue from Post Mortem Examination 
(London: DOH, 2001); Chief Medical Officer, Report of a Census of Organs and Tissues Retained by Pathology 
Services in England (London: DOH, 2001); and Health Services Directorate, Report at Post-mortem Examination 
and Disposal of Human Materials in the Chief Medical Officer’s Census of NHS Pathology Services (London: 
DOH, 2000). 
81
  See Department of Health, The Investigation of Events that Followed the Death of Cyril Mark Isaacs, 
(London: Crown, 2003). (Isaacs Report)  In Chief Medical Officer, ibid, it was reported that brains accounted for 
44% of all retained organs from 1970-1999. 
82
  See Isaacs Report, ibid, at 7 and 175. 
83
   T Millar et al, n 9 above, at 374. 
84
  See, e.g., T Beauchamp & R Faden, The History and Theory of Informed Consent (Oxford: OUP, 1986), 
G Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: CUP, 1988); T Beauchamp & J Childress, 
Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 4th ed (Oxford: OUP, 1994). 
85
  O O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), at 23. 
86
  See, e.g., P Slovic, The Perception of Risk (London: Earthscan, 2001), D Lupton, Risk (London: 
Routledge, 1999). 
87
  See, e.g., B Massumi, ‘Everywhere You Want to Be: Introduction to Fear’ in B Massumi (ed), The 
Politics of Everyday Fear (Minneapolis: U Minn Press, 1993) 3-38, D Lupton, Medicine as Culture: Illness, 
Disease and Bodies in Western Societies (London: SAGE, 2003). 
88
  See J Harris, n 58 above, at 531-532; M Sutrop, ‘Viewpoint: How to Avoid a Dichotomy Between 
Autonomy and Beneficence: From Liberalism to Communitarianism and Beyond’ (2011) 269 J Internal Med 
375-379, at 376. 
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atrocities committed during World War II.89  It has evolved as a means to facilitate the 
exercise of individual autonomy with respect to actions relating to one’s body (offering 
individuals some control over the risks to which they expose themselves), and authorisation 
has inarguably taken up that same cause.  In both cases, a key ambition is to inform 
individuals and allow them to make decisions relevant to risks, and their inclusion in 
regulation typically contains mandated assessments of risk or harm manifestation.  It must 
also be acknowledged that consent has a double effect in that obtaining it serves not only to 
protect patients but also to protect medical practitioners such as doctors, researchers, etc. 
from unwanted litigation.90  In the HTA 2004 and the HTSA 2006, the doctrines of consent 
and authorisation respectively replaced the ‘lack of objection’ criteria contained in the 
Human Tissue Act 1961.91 
 
B. Decisional Mechanisms under both Acts 
 
The HTA 2004 relies on a traditional consent model in that, after provision of relevant 
information addressing risks and benefits of the particular intervention (here donation), the 
‘appropriate consent’ must be given.  The ‘appropriateness’ is determined having reference 
to whether the statutorily required person has given the consent, and this depends on 
whether the subject (or donor) is an adult, an adult without capacity, or a child.  For 
example, under s. 3(6), the appropriate consent of an adult is manifested as his or her 
decision in force immediately before death.  If no such decision was made (or is known), 
then the appropriate consent is the decision of his or her ‘nominated person’ under s. 4.  If 
he or she has not nominated a decision-maker, then the appropriate consent is that of the 
person who stands in the most authoritative ‘qualifying relationship’ to him or her 
immediately prior to death.  The ranking of qualifying persons is set out in s. 27(4) as 
follows: spouse or partner; parent or child; brother or sister; grandparent or grandchild; 
child of a person the person concerned brother or sister; stepfather or stepmother; half-
brother or half-sister; friend of long-standing.  The Act offers nothing by way of criteria for 
shaping individual choices. 
As with consent, ‘authorisation’ under the HTSA 2006 is a decisional model driven by 
autonomy, risk, and the individual, and authorisation must be given by the ‘appropriate 
person’.  This varies depending on whether the donor is an adult, a child 12 years or over, or 
a child under 12 years.92  Like the consent model, authorisation draws heavily on risk.93  The 
                                                          
89
  T Caulfield et al, n 2 above. 
90
  This follows on from the Bolam principle whereby ‘a doctor is not negligent if he acts in accordance 
with a practice accepted at the time as proper by a responsible body of medical opinion’: Bolam v Friern 
Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582.  This, in turn, means that if consent which is deemed to 
be in accordance with the current practice by a reasonable body is obtained, then the doctor will not be liable 
in negligence.  In the Scottish context, see Hunter v Hanley 1955 SLT 213. 
91
  See Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, Death and the Procurator Fiscal: Information and 
Guidance for Medical Practitioners (2008), para. 16.1, at 
http://www.copfs.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Publications/Resource/Doc/13546/0000506.pdf [6 March 2013].  
Parenthetically, neither the HTA 2004 nor the HTSA 2006 specifically refer to brains or brain tissue, or indeed 
to any specific type of organ or tissue.  What is significant is the origin of the tissue (from humans) and the 
status of the donor at the moment of donation; brain tissue is considered to be tissue from a deceased person. 
92
  For guidance on the appropriate person, see HTSA 2006, ss. 6-10. 
93
  Although, as noted elsewhere, the individual risks associated with participating in biobanks are 
minimal, and are not at all commensurate with participation in more tradition trial-based research: see B 
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term ‘authorisation’, however, was preferred over that of consent because it was felt to 
better capture the actual interests and circumstances at play.  The influential McLean 
Report94 defended its preference as follows: 
 
• Authorisation would reinforce the belief (in everyone concerned) that individuals could 
and should make decisions about their own bodies, and that these decisions should be 
enforced.95 
 
• While ‘authorisation’ better captures the right of donors (or relatives) to receive full 
information, it preserves their right to decline certain details while still being able to 
make an enforceable/lawful decision; authorisation better balances the need for 
decision-makers to receive sufficient information to make a judgment and for staff to be 
more sensitive around the provision of information.96 
 
• The common law requirement that parental decisions relating to children be in the 
child’s ‘best interests’ put parents in an untenable position with respect to tissue/organ 
donation because ‘best interests’ would be difficult to demonstrate.  Authorisation 
better describes the obligations and powers which come with parenthood insofar as  it 
signals their rights against third parties who might try to interfere with family 
relationships.97 
 
In short, ‘authorisation’ was erected as an autonomy-based approach which has the primary 
goal of ensuring that the wishes of the deceased are enforced, but which has the ancillary 
aim of reducing the amount of information which decision-makers need in order to make an 
enforceable decision, whether that decision-maker is the deceased who may give 
authorisation prior to death, or surviving family members thereafter.  So conceived, 
‘authorisation’ is more suitable than ‘consent’ in the brain banking context, which implicates 
deceased individuals, for at least four reasons. 
First, a key ambition of consent, in addition to those noted above, is to protect the 
physical integrity interests of the living.98  However, this ambition has little relevance in the 
cadaveric context.  The reality is that the human corpse does not remain intact but rather 
naturally decomposes.99  Thus, there can be no legitimate interest in physical integrity after 
death.  Moreover, because bodies must be buried or cremated, there can also be no 
expectation of inviolability.  As such, one of the primary interests intended to be protected 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Prainsack & A Buyx, ‘A Solidarity-Based Approach to the Governance of Research Biobanks’ (2013) 21 Med Law 
Rev 71-91.  This might be viewed as doubly true where the participation occurs after death. 
94
 Independent Review Group, Retention of Organs at Post-Mortem: Final Report (Edinburgh: 
Department of Health, 2001). (McLean Report) 
95
 Ibid, at 41. 
96
  Ibid, at 41. 
97
 Ibid, at 29-31. 
98
 See, e.g., K Mason & G Laurie, n 13 above, at 717, J Harris, n 58 above, at 531, O O’Neil, ‘Some Limits 
on Informed Consent’ (2003) 29 J Med Ethics 4-7; J Wilson, ‘Is Respect for Autonomy Defensible?’(2007) 33 J 
Med Ethics 353-356; A McGuire et al, ‘DNA Data Sharing: Research Participants‘ Perspectives’ (2008) 10 
Genetics Med 46-53; and J Mason & G Laurie, Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, 8th ed 
(Oxford: OUP, 2011). 
99
 J Harris, n 58 above, at 547. 
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by consent is not directly engaged in deceased donation,100 and therefore, it may not be the 
most appropriate legal mechanism.   
Second, as articulated in the McLean Report, authorisation is intended to emphasise 
that the decision to donate does and should originate from the person’s own volition.  It is 
intended to signal a firmer commitment to respecting the expression that the individual 
made when alive.  Indeed, it has been emphasised that authorisation is intended to more 
clearly convey the idea that people have the right to express during their lifetime their 
wishes about what should happen to their bodies after death, and that they should be able 
to expect that those wishes will be respected.101  This suggests a more active role for the 
donor and a greater commitment to self-determination.102   
Third, it serves to ease the informational burden on all parties.  This is appropriate in 
two respects.  First, decisions need to be taken very soon after a person’s death; the brain 
deteriorates quickly so donation must be carried out within the first few days.103  
Authorisation acknowledges that the donor and/or relatives may not want to receive 
detailed information about the donation procedure, and it gives recruiters discretion about 
the amount and specificity of information which they provide to donors/relatives should 
these parties agree to this, though of course recruiters must still give sufficient information 
to allow a decision to be made.  Second, it acknowledges that some information around the 
purposes of tissue use (and thus possible longer term risks) cannot be known at the time of 
recruitment or donation (ie: it better caters for situations where research uses may not be 
fully known and where research may develop in a different manner than originally 
conceived).104  In both cases, it signals that donation is still permitted provided the 
authorising person has sufficient information to make a decision.  
Fourth, and following on from the third reason, authorisation diminishes the need 
for re-contact, or reduces the circumstances under which re-contact and new authorisations 
will be necessary, which, in the brain banking case, would necessarily implicate third parties.  
Indeed, the Organ Donation Taskforce has opined that consent requirements are not 
fulfilled where relatives have to make the decision and are unclear as to what the donor 
would have wished.105  The Taskforce claimed that the process is more appropriately viewed 
as an act of ‘authorisation’,106 again reinforcing the distinction between the two concepts.  
                                                          
100
 See E Patridge, ‘Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Respect’ (1981) 91 Ethics 243-264; W 
Waluchow, ‘Feinberg’s Theory of “Preposthumous” Harm’ (1986) 25 Dialogue 727-734. 
101
  Scottish Executive Health Department, Human Tissue Act 2006: A Guide to its Implementation for NHS 
Scotland (Edinburgh: SE, 2006) para. 8. 
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  Currently, such expressions are often undermined by third parties, prompting the question of 
whether we should ever let others make determinations over another’s body.  In the event that we do, and 
clearly the HTA 2004 and HTSA 2006 provide that we do, the question of to whom that power falls is one that 
we may not have answered correctly.  For more on deceased donation, see K Mason & G Laurie, n 13 above. 
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  The interval between death and post-mortem varies depending on legal and resource constraints.  In 
the MRC Sudden Death Brain and Tissue Bank, the interval was measured at between 28-140 hours with a 
mean of 70 hours: T Millar et al, n 9 above, at 372.  For a discussion on the effect of post mortem delay on 
tissue, see I Ferrer et al, ‘Brain Banks: Benefits, Limitations and Cautions Concerning the Use of Post-Mortem 
Brain Tissue for Molecular Studies’ (2008) 9 Cell Tissue Banking 181-194. 
104  T Caulfield, R Upshur & A Daar, ‘DNA Databanks and Consent: A Suggested Policy Model Involving an 
Authorization Model’ (2003) 4 BMC Med Ethics 1-4. 
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  Organ Donation Taskforce, The Potential Impact of an Opt Out System for Organ Donation in the UK 
(London: Crown Printer, 2008), at 1.12. 
106
  Ibid, at 7.5. 
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To alleviate the third party involvement complication, one might draft consent forms very 
broadly so as to cover many potential uses, but this challenges the ‘informedness’ on which 
consent is founded. 
The consequence of the above is that there are important conceptual differences 
between consent and authorisation.  While both advance the ethical interests of decisional 
integrity, they do not demand uniform or common practices; they might be viewed as 
ethically ‘equivalent’ rather than ‘equal’, and so might be held up as an example of 
‘harmonised’ rather than ‘standardised’ approaches to conduct (ie: as non-standardised 
practices that are equally acceptable and effective).107  Unfortunately for recruiters in 
Scotland, the HTA and Scottish authorities (and perhaps patients) seem to view consent and 
authorisation as convergent and standardised, and so performed in largely the same 
manner with the same steps and tools.  While the regulator’s aim is to ensure ‘continuation 
of the arrangements for sharing organs and tissue across the UK,’108 the result is that 
authorisation does not do the work it might otherwise accomplish; like consent, it leaves 
significant scope for family interference in donation decisions, thereby prioritising family 
affecting interests over those of the donor and the public. 
 
C. Divergence Between Rules and Practice 
 
The lapse of time between the deceased’s expression of giving and the act of donation, 
combined with the absence of the donor at the actual time of the donation, results in a 
peculiar operation of consent/authorisation whereby the donor can become, and often is, 
marginalised.  Unless an Advanced Directive is operable or the express wishes of the 
deceased are otherwise known to the physician(s) involved in the donor’s palliative care or 
post-palliative handling, brain bank recruiters will have to solicit and comply with the wishes 
of a third party, which usually means a family member or members.  The difficulty of their 
job is compounded by the fact that decisions need to be taken very soon after a person’s 
death.  These can be emotionally charged days, and the family may not be equipped to deal 
with decisions in relation to donation and dissection. 
The statutes clearly identify the order of those who have decisional priority, placing 
the deceased at the top.109  However, even in cases where a deceased person has expressed 
a clear wish to donate his or her brain or other tissue, those wishes will not be carried out 
by physicians/researchers in the face of objections by family members.110  In short, despite 
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 Human Tissue Authority, Code of Practice 1: Consent (London: HTA, 2009), para. 16. 
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  Organ Donation Taskforce, n 105 above, and see also Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Human Bodies: 
Donation for Medicine and Research (London: NCB, 2011), para. 2.15. 
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  See s. 27(4) HTA 2004 and s. 50 HTSA 2006. 
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an absence of any statutory veto, family members (sometimes regardless of where they 
rank in the decisional hierarchy) may still, and do, veto deceased donation decisions 
properly made and recorded,111 a scenario which has been described as a ‘double veto’.112  
This of course does nothing to respect the decision of the deceased who, while alive, made 
a reasoned and morally conscious decision about their death and the disposition of their 
body (and its parts); presumably, they wanted to contribute in some way to society through 
research in keeping with their duties under the social contract model.  It also fails to 
recognise and enforce the statutory hierarchy of authority in situations where there are 
conflicting positions amongst the survivors. 
While this deferential seems unjustified under both consent and authorisation 
models, it is particularly contrary to the latter, which is intended to signal a stronger 
commitment to carry out a deceased donor’s wishes.  The McLean Report was adamant that 
those wishes should be paramount, stating that they should be respected ‘unless there is 
reason to believe that the deceased had a change of mind before death.’113  Indeed, the 
McLean Report was specifically critical of the old practice of giving priority to family wishes: 
 
very often interpretation of the law has gone beyond its strict requirements. 
Doctors will virtually always ask relatives actively to agree to the use of the 
dead body, rather than, simply asking about the wishes of the deceased. 
While this practice is understandable given the circumstances, it fails 
spectacularly to respect the competently expressed wishes of the person now 
deceased.114 [emphasis added] 
 
It recommended that: 
 
the expressed wishes of the individual adult, competently made before 
death, should take priority over the wishes of surviving relatives. The current 
legal requirement to discover whether or not this agreement has been 
withdrawn should remain, but it must be clear that the relatives have no 
legal role in circumstances where the deceased had made known, and not 
retracted, his or her wishes…. An important concomitant of this 
recommendation to be a campaign directed at those who may wish to make 
such a declaration to encourage them to discuss their wishes freely and fully 
with those who will ultimately be asked about the deceased’s intentions...115 
 
Despite the above, this deferential approach has both some commendable practical 
consequences and some regulatory support.  With respect to the former, it is a pragmatic 
and sensitive approach to dealing with bereaved families.  Medical practitioners have no 
wish to compound the emotional difficulties of mourning families, and they have strong self-
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interest in not embroiling themselves in unseemly disputes over the use of a deceased 
family member’s body, particularly with the retained body parts scandal so recently in the 
past.  Thus, as a simple matter of relational harmony and reputational preservation, and 
indeed as an act of solidarity with the bereaved family, this approach makes sense on the 
ground.  In the context of organ donation for transplantation, the Scottish government has 
stated: 
 
Few, if any, transplant surgeons would go against the wishes of a family.  
Whilst there are unlikely to be any repercussions against a surgeon who 
removed organs in the face of family objections from a person who wished 
to be a donor, there are few surgeons who would add to the stress of a 
grieving family by acting contrary to their wishes.  Negative publicity from 
such an act would also have a detrimental effect on organ donation.116 
 
Additionally, this approach permits an operational flexibility, allowing the physician (or 
recruiter) to exercise personal and professional judgment about how to proceed in each 
case.  In short, sensitivity and respect are cornerstones of the interaction; not respect for 
the deceased but for those who remain.  Such respect should be a fundamental element of 
the physician’s (and recruiter’s) professional duties, and a formative part of the professional 
team’s interactions with patients and families.  It reflects a valuable civility that has been 
encouraged by the post-paternalistic turn in medical culture; whereas practitioners once 
decided with little or no consultation what was in the interest of the patient, patients now 
are expected to be more actively involved in treatment decisions through conversations 
about their care/treatment. 
 With respect to regulatory support, the deferential approach is acknowledged by the 
HTA’s Code of Practice I: Consent.  Applicable to both the English/Welsh/Northern Irish and 
Scottish frameworks, it states that if a deceased person or nominated representative has 
consented to donation but those close to the deceased object, a healthcare professional 
should discuss the matter sensitively with the parties, should encourage the objector(s) to 
accept the wishes of the deceased, and should be informed that they have no right to veto 
these wishes.117  It goes on to state, that in such circumstances a practitioner should 
consider ‘the impact of going ahead with a procedure in light of strong opposition of the 
family, despite the legal basis for doing so.’118  This inconsistency (between statute and 
practice guidance) is also evident in the Code’s guidance relating to child donation in cases 
where the wishes of the parents or guardians conflict.  It states that it is sufficient for one 
person in a position of parental responsibility to give consent to donation of a deceased 
child’s tissue/organs, but then advises that: 
 
The issue should be discussed fully with relatives and careful thought should 
be given as to whether to proceed if a disagreement arises between parents 
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or family members. Any previously stated wishes of the deceased child 
should be considered, taking into account their age and understanding.119 
 
The real-world consequence is that, regardless of whether HTA 2004 ‘consent’ or HTSA 2006 
‘authorisation’ is relied on, neither legal mechanism is strictly enforced in the face of 
objections by family members, or conflicts within the family.120 
 
V. SOLIDARITY AND AN EMPHASIS ON THE ‘PUBLIC’ IN BRAIN BANKING 
 
Although both the HTA 2004 and HTSA 2006 are grounded on autonomy and risk, and on 
the decisional authority of the individual, with authorisation intended to be even more 
autonomy-confirming than consent, practices on the ground have served to erode the 
differences between consent and authorisation, and to weaken the operation of both 
mechanisms insofar as recruiters are challenged by survivor opposition in the face of 
deceased consent/authorisation.  While this might be seen to contribute to a more 
cooperative decision-making process around the use of bodies, it has had the real-world 
effect of blocking donation in the face of any objections by survivors.  Ironically, the 
autonomy interest that frames the whole regime gets frustrated and the regulation fails to 
deliver on its promise to the deceased and the scientific undertaking.  We suggest an 
approach more sensitive to the obvious and important ‘public interest’ aspects of brain 
banking, which are currently under-emphasised in the legislation and under-operationalised 
in practice.121 
 
A. A Value Foundation to Support the Public Interest 
 
To make a real impact, the public interest must be given a role more in keeping with its 
significance (ie: given the increasingly high statistics and incidence of brain disease, it is 
imperative that research in this area is actively supported and that the public benefits are 
both emphasised and realised).  There is thus a need to recognise the ‘public’ as an 
important stake-holder in the donation framework.  This can only be achieved if the value-
base underpinning the human tissue use regime is broadened.122  In particular, ‘solidarity’ 
should be deployed as an action- and decision-guiding value in relation to the dead body; 
indeed, it should be given a prominence that is at least equivalent to other guiding values, 
including autonomy.123  Solidarity has been defined as encompassing the following 
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1185-1186. 
123
  We do not wish to be seen as overly critical of autonomy.  Autonomy can and does serve the public 
good and is not necessarily contrary to public mores or community wellbeing.  However, the over-
individualisation of autonomy has the effect of erecting and encouraging the idea of a freestanding individual 
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interrelated and mutually enhancing virtue-propositions:124 
 
• Solidarity prioritises community by recognising that individuals are naturally and 
irrevocably embedded in social contexts; they are in a state of interrelationship or 
interconnectedness with individuals, groups and society. 
 
• Solidarity emphasises equality and active promotion of welfare through its grounding in 
compassion, fraternity and a genuine interest in the wellbeing of others, the ultimate 
goal being to construct, through personal and collective actions, both a just and decent 
or fair society. 
 
• As a result of our inclusion in societies and the complex of social relationships and 
values that is needed to realise standards of decency and justice within societies, 
solidarity emphasises the virtue of duties over rights; duties flowing from and toward 
individuals and communities that may require collective interests and public goods to 
take priority over the interest of individuals or sub-collectives. 
 
So conceptualised, solidarity helps us characterise participation in brain banking as a 
beneficial opportunity, if not an obligation, to contribute to individual and public health 
beyond one’s lifetime; it characterises participation as a legacy which contributes to 
intergenerational justice by enabling the health of future generations, and, as such, is a 
means to advance human wellbeing more generally.125  If solidarity is better integrated into 
the legislative regime and the decisions that it structures, a new interaction can be 
framed.126  And this interaction might better close the gap between levels of claimed 
support for research and the opportunity to make a contribution, and actual participation in 
research.127 
In a recent report commissioned by the Nuffield Council, the authors conceive of 
solidarity as signifying a collective commitment to carry ‘costs’ (financial, social, emotional, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
independent of the community and with few responsibilities to the community, or responsibilities for the 
consequences to the community of his or her individualist choices: W Gaylin & B Jennings, The Perversion of 
Autonomy: Coercion and Constraints in a Liberal Society (Georgetown: GUP, 2003), at 203. 
124
  S Harmon, n 122 above. 
125
 For more on intergenerational justice, see, e.g., H ten Have, ‘Global Bioethics and Communitarianism’ 
(2011) 32 Theor Med Bioethics 315-322, B Knoppers & Y Joly, ‘Our Social Genome’ (2007) 25 Trends in 
Biotechnology 284-288. 
126
  For more on solidarity, see S Harmon, n 122 above, R Houtepen & R ter Meulen, ‘New Types of 
Solidarity in the European Welfare State’ (2000) 8 Health Care Anal 329-340; R Ashcroft, A Campbell & S Jones, 
‘Solidarity, Society and the Welfare State in the United Kingdom’ (2000) 8 Health Care Anal 377-394; R 
Chadwick & K Berg, ‘Solidarity and Equity: New Ethical Frameworks for Genetic Databases’ (2001) 2 Nat Rev 
Genet 318-21; S Sternø, Solidarity in Europe: The History of an Idea (Cambridge: CUP, 2004); M Haӱry, 
‘Precaution and Solidarity’ (2005) 14 Cambridge Q Healthcare Ethics 199-206; R ter Meulen, W Arts & R 
Muffels (eds), Solidarity in Health and Social Care in Europe (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2010).  For more on 
solidarity’s many inclusions in international biolaw, see S Harmon, ‘Ethical Rhetoric: Genomics and the Moral 
Content of UNESCO’s ‘Universal’ Declarations’ (2008) 34 J Med Ethics e24. 
127
  Research shows that family members often derive some comfort from their loved ones’ donation, but 
that the strongest support for donation comes from families who have lost a member to a particularly tragic 
circumstance such as a sudden accident or death by suicide: see T Millar et al, n 9 above, at 372, Table 2; J Bell 
et al, n 5 above, at 505. 
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or otherwise) to assist others that requires individual actions and collective commitment.128  
The report offers a 3-tier approach to how individuals might interact with solidarity:129 
 
• Tier-1: Interpersonal: At base, solidarity is viewed as an expression of willingness to 
carry costs to help others with whom a person recognises similarity, sameness, or 
symmetry.  It demands actions by individuals to help other individuals within a group or 
community who share certain things in common with them. 
 
• Tier-2: Group Internalisation: This solidarity arises when certain action elements of 
solidarity become engrained in a group (ie: come to represent an aspect of ‘good 
conduct’), and so evolve into forms of institutionalisation.  At this level, solidarity can be 
defined as ‘manifestations of a collective community to carry costs to assist others who 
are all linked by means of a shared situation or cause,’130 and a common example of this 
is self-help or patient groups. 
 
• Tier-3: Contractual/Legal: This tier is where the social norms of the previous tiers 
solidify into contractual or other legal norms; it is a fixed or enforced form of solidarity, 
examples of which include the welfare state, social welfare arrangements, statutorily-
protected/enforced trade unionism, etc. 
 
This framework is useful for thinking about where solidarity needs to be introduced and 
how it might be embedded to reorient public perceptions about, and the regulatory regime 
applicable to, brain banking, and we shall return to it below.  Suffice to say presently, we 
believe that shifting both participation levels in biobanks and regulatory frameworks 
demands two interrelated movements: first, the public interest must be understood in a 
more active sense which not only recognises rights, but also duties (ie: it must be 
understood as demanding positive efforts on the part of individuals as a component of their 
social citizenship); and, second, the moral or value-foundation of the public interest (and 
public goods) must be given a more prominent role, both generally and in individual 
conversations (such as that between physician/recruiter and patient/family).  Solidarity 
offers a valuable touchstone for undertaking or facilitating these movements.   
 
B. Operationalising Solidarity in Brain Banking 
 
Conceptualising participation in brain banking as an act of solidarity justified (if not 
demanded) by the public interest encourages a shift toward greater consideration of the 
public good aspect of the enterprise. So grounded, the implications for brain banks might be 
that a system of mandatory donation to brain banks could be justified on utilitarian, virtue, 
and international human rights grounds.131  While mandatory donation might be considered 
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  See B Prainsack & A Buyx, Solidarity: Reflections on an Emerging Concept in Bioethics (London: 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011), at 5.3 and 5.4, a characterisation taken up by the authors of the report in 
subsequent publications. 
129
 Ibid, at 5.7-5.13. 
130
  Ibid, at 5.12. 
131
  For arguments in favour of a duty to participate in research, see S Harmon, n 122 above; J Harris, 
‘Scientific Research is a Moral Duty’ (2005) 31 J Med Ethics 242-248.  The duty might be considered even 
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problematic by some, particularly in our prevailing individualistic social context, additionally 
so in this context given the deep personal and growing cultural significance of the brain,132 it 
is not without its supporters.  A mandatory system has been justified in other contexts on 
the grounds that individuals receive public health benefits stemming from brain and other 
life science research, and they must therefore be viewed as accepting those benefits on the 
understanding that they may need to contribute to the ‘public good’ by donating post 
mortem tissue for such research.  Indeed, it has been argued that if we accept the benefits 
of medical research (eg: antibiotics and other medicines), then we have an obligation to 
contribute to social practice which produce those benefits.133  Where that contribution is 
only made after death, the argument is even stronger,134 although such a system would 
need to incorporate provisions permitting individuals to object to donation in keeping with 
other human rights (eg: freedom of religion), which would operate in exceptional 
circumstances. 
Despite the defensibility of mandatory donation, we are not arguing for this, and the 
sheer cost and personnel demands would, in any event, make it unsustainable.  Further, it 
should be acknowledged that brain banks do not require donation from all individuals; they 
merely need an increase in current donation rates, particularly of ‘normal’ brains.  Thus, we 
propose a regime which gives preference to public needs, and which justifies those 
preferences with reference to the public good that is health, the public interest in its 
achievement, and acknowledgement of the ‘social contract’ which we all enter into.  The 
social contract theory recognises that individuals gain benefits from society (and this is 
certainly so in a democratic welfare state with a free-at-point-of-service healthcare system), 
and it holds that individuals must therefore also give back to society.135  As part of that, they 
must accept that their interests may sometimes be compromised for the ‘public good’; and 
what less intrusive time to compromise those individual interests than after death when the 
compromise will mean nothing to the individual who is being asked/commanded to 
contribute?  If we accept that individuals and society are in a contractual relationship in 
which each entity must not only receive but should also give, the question becomes: How 
can we better embed the notion that it is a social responsibility to support biobanking?  
Here we can draw on the 3-tier interaction set out by Prainsack and Buyx. 
When individuals decide to participate in a biobank, it is an act of Tier-1 solidarity 
insofar as they do so with the acceptance that certain costs will be incurred by them (or 
their survivors) for the sake of communal benefit.136 Increased participation will be 
facilitated by attitudinal change; people must be encouraged to internalise solidarity and to 
accept the responsibility to act, for values are most commonly operationalised when they 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
stronger where, as here, there is no risk of harm to the individual participant (because he or she is already 
dead).  
132
  A point which came up in the BOTB Project: see S Harmon & G Haddow, n 50 above. 
133
  J Harris, n 131 above, at 243.  He goes on to argue that individuals are already required to make 
contributions to the public good (eg: through taxation or jury service), and there is no reason why the same 
justification would not ground a contribution to research. 
134
  See D Price, Human Tissue in Transplantation and Research: A Model Legal and Ethical Donation 
Framework (Cambridge: CUP, 2010) 53-63. 
135
  See J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). 
136
  B Prainsack and A Buyx, n 128 above, at 6.18. 
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are internalised and embraced by publics.137  This can be done through public campaigns 
highlighting the prevalence of brain conditions, the pivotal role of brain banks in the 
treatment of same, and the benefits of research participation.138  While some question the 
propriety and effectiveness of ‘nudge’ policies,139 their use of sociology, behavioural 
economics and social psychology is a practical way to rationally structure choice 
architecture so socially useful outcomes can be achieved.140  It has already been pointed out 
that the problem of countervailing nudges must be overcome if such campaigns are to 
work.141  Obviously, that countervailing push should not come from regulation.  Indeed, we 
argue that the campaigns could be statutorily dictated, as has been done in Wales with 
respect to transplantation; the Human Transplantation of Organs (Wales) Act 2013 imposes 
a duty on Welsh Ministers to promote transplantation and encourage donations deemed 
necessary for the improvement of the health of the people of Wales.142 
Tier-2 solidarity is implicated by how the bank structures its decision-making, how it 
shapes its relationship and interactions with the public, and how it communicates.143  The 
bank must view its donors (and more specifically their surviving family members) as 
partners in the research endeavour to whom the bank owes certain duties important to the 
maintenance of trust, and it must structure its governance and interactions as such.144  This 
also has state implications.  First, more optimal and transparent biobank structures and 
governance arrangements could be statutorily shaped.  Second, a magnitude change in 
donation would demand a firm commitment by the state to provide sufficient financial 
support to ensure that resources and personnel are available to manage that increased 
donation.145  This is particularly important because the agreement to donate (ie: to bear 
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  So pointed out by C Casillas, P Enns & P Wohlfarth, ‘How Public Opinion Constrains the US Supreme 
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  Secretary of State for Health, Healthy Lives, Healthy People: Our Strategy for Public Health in England 
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that cost) must be met with effective measures to make that donation meaningful.  If efforts 
or resources are wasted, public mistrust could justifiably set in. 
An example of how tier-3 might be engaged is when solidarity is used to shape 
statutory structures so that they are more reflective of public goods and the public 
interest.146  The law should explicitly adopt solidarity as a guiding value in an effort to make 
a positive difference in recruitment practices and participation levels.  Solidarity can be 
relied on to: 
 
• more stoutly vindicate the wishes of a deceased to donate in the face of resistance by 
survivors (ie: the use of solidarity to better operationalise autonomy); and 
 
• more openly override the deceased’s (or survivors’) decision to not donate in limited 
circumstances (such as when the individual has a rare disease that has become the 
target of research, or where brain banks make a specific call for ‘normal’ brains). 
 
In furtherance of this, we suggest that ‘authorisation’ is the most appropriate decisional 
mechanism, and that, to work optimally, that mechanism must stipulate discourses which 
encourage all parties to consciously consider the public good of health, the public interest in 
(brain) banking, and the fundamental value of ‘solidarity’ in the exercise of their autonomy.  
In other words, it must inject some non-risk-based decisional criteria into the interaction in 
recognition of the fact that the individual risks of participating in biobanks are minimal (and 
not commensurate with participating in more tradition trial-based research).147   
Additionally, parties must be assigned authority commensurate with their interest in the 
cadaver.  Obviously, the first interest holder is the deceased insofar as she wishes to donate 
and has made that wish known. This conscious choice, made when the deceased was a 
living, rights-bearing individual with autonomy interests, benefits the many and so, despite 
the above-noted evaporation of interests upon death, should, in the round, be respected. 
Not only does this respect reflect the value we – the public – placed on the individual when 
she was alive, it might also be characterised (cautiously) as a ‘memorial right’, meaning a 
right that was held and exercised in life that should be (and can only be) vindicated after 
death. As such, it is important to acknowledge that it is the (deceased) individual’s right, not 
the family’s right, and it should be seen as vesting upon death with the public, thereby 
enhancing the possibility of vindication.148 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Efficient Strategies of Organ Procurement the Answer to Persistent Organ Shortage in Transplantation?’ (1992) 
9 Bioethics 113-129. 
146
  Prainsack and Buyx offer the circumstance of data-sharing practices being imposed as contractual 
obligations for access to the resource as another example of tier-3 solidarity in action: see B Prainsack & A 
Buyx, n 128, at 6.34. 
147
  For a brief discussion of the risks, see B Prainsack & A Buyx, n 93 above. 
148 Again, and importantly, we are not proposing a framework for mandatory donation, but rather a 
conceptual change to the framework founded on solidarity. Under such a framework, active individual 
contribution and attitudinal change surrounding donation and medical research generally are encouraged, and 
such is supported by the above. 
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 In all other situations, the interest ranking must run from public, down to family, 
down to deceased.  This acknowledges how decisional autonomy in relation to the corpse 
falls away upon the individual’s death, and that the most interested remaining party is the 
public.  Others – who have no strong principled interest in the corpse other than beliefs 
grounded in religion, superstition, or revulsion – should not hold a veto unless their 
objection is based on reliable evidence that the deceased objected to donation.  Again, a 
provision similar to that in the Human Transplantation of Organs (Wales) Act 2013 relating 
to families would be useful.149  This position is supported by Harris, who argues that, if we 
are to presume anything of the deceased, we should presume that he or she would have 
wished to donate; it right to assume that the deceased had no interest in frustrating 
knowledge or increasing the probability of others’ death.150 
In addition to altering how donation is broached and supported, a solidarity 
approach would have implications for consent documents (and re-consent for new uses of 
the samples).  Rather than over-emphasise risks, the consent process and its documentation 
would make greater efforts to highlight the benefits of donation and to inform parties about 
how the bank has structured its governance, oversight, and access policies so as to maximise 
utility and transparency, and to minimise and then appropriately manage risks.  It would 
demand admitting to potential donors that neither recruiters nor bank custodians can know 
all possible uses or research directions, and that the donor would be agreeing to participate 
in a context of uncertainty.151  It would emphasise the values and goals of the bank to which 
the donor would be contributing, and the Agreement to Participate could:152 
 
• acknowledge that the donor has considered the possible advantages and disadvantages 
of participation, including worst-case scenarios; 
 
• articulate that the surviving representative would be entitled to continue to dialogue 
with the bank on an ongoing basis; and 
 
• stipulate that the bank can use the tissue for research purposes into future, including 
for unforeseen or changing research aims so long as they comply with the clearly stated 
values or mission of the bank. 
 
This approach, which shares some characteristics with previously discussed ‘consent as a 
propositional attitude’ and ‘participation as a public interest’ approaches,153 vindicates 
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autonomy within a solidarity framework that grants banks the flexibility needed to remain 
viable and effective over time. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Neurological diseases are on the rise worldwide, and so research aimed at understanding 
and alleviating them will play an increasingly critical role in human health and wellbeing, 
and on the capacity of public healthcare systems to cope with demands.  Brain banks are 
essential to that undertaking.  However, for brain banks to deliver on their promises, there 
must be a shift in how we think about brain banking.  The consent model under the HTA 
2004 has a number of shortcomings, most notably the tension provoked by the 
individualistic nature of consent, which fails to offer any space for consideration of the 
community-enhancing aims of brain banking.  While the authorisation model under the 
HTSA 2006 is arguably even more autonomy-centred, it might be viewed as an 
improvement.154  However, its reliance on the same narrow value foundation as the HTA 
2004 means that it also fails to express the values most advantageous to banking and to 
truly reifying the difference that authorisation was supposed to achieve. 
The statutory frameworks would benefit (and so would the biobanking enterprise 
and society) from a greater emphasis on solidarity as a guiding value.  Discussions which 
include explicit references to solidarity (in addition to autonomy and risk) remind us that we 
are part of a broader community, and that individuals have (and should fulfil) obligations 
toward that community.  Incorporating solidarity into our legislative frameworks and 
recruitment practices would better respect the wishes of the deceased (in cases where 
those wishes are now being overridden by family members), and would better realise the 
public interest and public goods that are at play.  In this regard, it behoves us to make every 
effort to maximise the public investment that has been made in these resources, and to 
advance the public interest that brain banks underwrite. 
A solidarity-grounded regime might offer solutions to some of the recurrent 
challenges or practical questions faced by brain banks.  Having reference to the questions 
posed in the Introduction, we might argue as follows: 
 
• Who should consent in the absence of the expressed wishes of the deceased?  Drawing 
on an assumption that people wish to contribute positively to society and to facilitate 
scientific knowledge as a public good (and indeed the public good), and that they are 
(or should be) supportive of ethical research and donation thereto (and this assumption 
is reinforced by their acceptance of the fruits of medical research), the Coroner or 
Procurator Fiscal should consent to donation for research when they have care of a 
cadaver, and they should be able to trump most objections raised by the family in other 
situations.  In short, solidarity supports public authorities having greater power to 
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prevail if there is a variance of views as to what should be done with the deceased’s 
brain when the deceased has been silent as to donation. 
 
• If the known wishes of the deceased conflict with those of the family, who prevails?  If 
there are conflicting views as between the deceased (wishing to donate) and surviving 
family members (wishing to preserve the corpse intact), there should again be a 
presumption in favour of donation which is in the ‘public good’; indeed this does 
nothing more than vindicate the autonomous choice of the deceased, an outcome 
which the deceased would have expected (and presumably did expect when s/he was 
alive). 
 
• If re-consent is needed for new research, who should provide this, especially if the 
deceased gave the original consent?  The original provision of information should 
address this scenario squarely, and the Agreement to Participate should be drafted such 
that re-consent or re-authorisation is not required when new avenues of investigation 
emerge post-donation; it should ensure that the agreement to donate means donating 
to the brain bank, with all that that entails, not to a specific research target.  The bank’s 
governance structure, in turn, should be such as to ensure transparency of decision-
making, clarity around and ease of access, and availability of information to the public 
(ie: it should have an accessible communications element).155 
 
Obviously, a key component of the legal and decisional framework would be transparency. 
This is not a strong feature in existing regimes because neither the decisional hierarchies nor 
the factors which go into arriving at decisions are clear.  Improved transparency would 
encourage solidarity and make clearer to people how biobanks aim to realise reciprocity, 
another important driving value in this field.  By embedding solidarity in the legal framework 
for brain donation and shifting the focus from the risks of donation (which are limited in the 
cadaveric context) to the opportunity presented for individuals to contribute to the health 
and legacy of future generations, a more sustained commitment to, and realisation of, the 
public good will be possible, and could be actively encouraged.156 
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